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NOTES
certifications of labor unions is entrusted expressly and solely to the
NLRB"' and rightly so with the uncertainty in future dealings that would
result when an employer had to deal with a union which was both certi-
fied and uncertified." 2
The Supreme Court, in considering whether courts should be per-
mitted to determine a union's certification, ruled that certification was
for the Board."' Reference was made to the Board's administrative
prudence in furthering industrial stability in such matters and the fact
that decertifying a defunct"4 or employer-dominated" 5 union is highly
discretionary. In any event, the language of 8(b) (4) (c) clearly re-
quires that any changes in certification must first comply with the pro-
visions of section 9,11' which sets forth Board procedure for determining
whether a union should be certified or not.
OBSERVATIONS ON CONDOMINIUMS IN INDIANA:
THE HORIZONTAL PROPERTY ACT OF 1963
As residential land-use in urban areas becomes more intensive to
house an expanding population, fewer families will be able to enjoy ad-
vantages of home ownership. The ownership in fee of individual apart-
ments in larger structures, as made possible in condominiums,' offers a
potential solution to that problem. The condominium is a new concept
111. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 404 (1940). It was
stated by the court in Pepper & Polter, Inc. v. Local 977, Automobile Workers Union,
103 F. Supp. 684, 688 (S.D. N.Y. 1952), that: "It must be presumed that the orderly
procedure contemplated by § 9 was intended as the sole and exclusive method of de-
certification." So a union cannot even voluntarily self-decertify itself. See Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 995, 996 (1945).
112. E.g., a certified union does not have to endure an election for a period of
time whereas an uncertified union is always subject to a management petition for an elec-
tion. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1958).
113. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96. 103-04 (1954).
114. Even though a certified union no longer functions nor represents a majority
of the employees, the certification still retains "vitality to protect an employer against a
raiding rival whose objective is forcing or requiring such employer to recognize or bar-
gain with it as the representative of his employees." Such remains the case until certi-
fication is effectively extinguished by Board action. Parks v. Atlanta Printing Press-
men Union, 243 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1957).
115. Lewis Food Co. v. Los Angeles Meat Drivers, 159 F. Supp. 763 (S.D. Calif.
1958).
116. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958).
1. The term "condominium" comes from the civil law and means literally "co-
ownership" in the sense of limited ownership. BLACK, LAw DICrONARY, 367 (4th ed.
1951).
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in the United States,' and the general reaction of commentators to it has
been favorable.'
The condominium best can be characterized by comparison and con-
trast with another type of multi-family unit which it in many respects re-
sembles-the apartment cooperative.4 Although both the condominium
and the cooperative involve the ownership of multiple occupancy build-
ings, the cooperative is typically owned by a corporation, and the right to
lease space in the cooperative is acquired by ownership of stock or shares
in the corporation. In a condominium, however, the individual apart-
ments are not leased from a central organization holding title to the en-
tire structure in fee simple, but rather each unit is conveyed in fee simple
absolute to its occupant, together with an undivided interest in that part
of the property not contained in another unit. Underlying land, sup-
porting structural elements, hallways, heating equipment, and swimming
pools are examples of property which the occupant owns as a tenant-in-
common with the other apartment owners. That part of the occupant's
estate owned in fee simple absolute, the apartment unit itself, is often
conceived of as a block of space bounded not only by the vertical planes
usually used to describe surface realty, but also by horizontal planes.'
Thus, the occupant in a condominium is conceived of as "owning" his
apartment. He can separately mortgage it,6 and as in a cooperative he
2. Hearings on General Housing Legislation Before the Subcomnittee on Housing
of the House Committee on Banking and Currency. 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 248 (1960).
3. See, e.g., Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUu.
L. REv. 987 (1963), and the symposium in 14 HAsTINGS L.J. 189-335 (1963) for excel-
lent discussions of many of the general issues raised by condominiums. Typical of the
literature discussing more specialized aspects are Kerr, Will Condomninium Come to Con-
necticut?, 36 CoNN. B.J. 481 (1962) ; Welfeld, The Condominium and Medial Income
Housing, 31 FORlIIA-m L. REv. 457 (1963) ; Smith, The Case for a Condominium Law in
Pennsylvania, 33 PA. B.A.Q. 513 (1963) ; Thuma, The Condominium-A New Form of
the Cooperative, 41 TITLE NEws 126 (1962); and Skaggs and Irwin, The Horizontal
Property Law of Kentucky, 51 Ky. L.J. 46 (1962).
This interest seems to have been generated originally in Puerto Rico, where legisla-
tion permitting condominiums was first passed in 1951. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 1275
(1955). For a discussion of the Puerto Rican experience with condominiums and the
effect of Puerto Rican advocates on the passage of legislation authorizing FHA insured
mortgages on condominiums, see Berger, supra at 987.
4. See Thuma, supra note 3; Whitebrook, Cooperative Apartment, 9 PRAc. LAW. 25
(1963) ; Johnson, Legal Problems of Cooperative Housing in Illinois, 50 ILL. B.J. 940
(1962); and Note, Survey of the Legal Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Ownership.
16 U. MIAmi L. RFv. 305 (1961).
5. This is the source of the term "horizontal property regime." This term has
been criticized as confusing, since the estate is bounded by vertical planes as well. See
Kerr, stepra note 3, at 484. In the long run, accuracy of description would seem to be
better served by use of the word "condominium." Because of its novelty and foreign
origin, it is free of inaccurate connotations and presents practitioners with an
opportunity to attach the proper connotations to it. "Condominium" shall be used uni-
formly in this note.
6. Berger, supra note 3, at 994, suggests that this is the factor on which condo-
miniums will succeed or fail. See also Note, 14 HASTINGs L.J. 282 (1963).
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cannot be evicted for default as a lessee or escape his subsequent obliga-
tions by abandonment.' In a cooperative the payments on the leases main-
tain the building. In a condominium, however, maintenance and repair
of those parts of the building not a part of an apartment are borne by
assessments levied against the individual property owners by a managing
association. In Indiana, every apartment owner is required by section 2
of the act to be a member of the association.'
Much of the interest in condominiums has been a result of the enact-
ment of Section 234 of the National Housing Act,9 which authorizes the
Federal Housing Administration to insure mortgages on individually
owned units in multi-unit structures. Pursuant to this legislation the
Federal Housing Administration has adopted regulations concerning the
qualifications for obtaining this mortgage insurance, and some of these
qualifications, which include the ownership of an apartment in fee, the
enforceability of collection of common expenses, and individual tax as-
sessment of apartments, can be met only if state law permits." To in-
sure that condominiums of the type the FHA will insure are possible, the
FHA has written a model statute for consideration by the states," and
many states have passed enabling legislation.'2
Stripped to its essential points, Indiana's legislation 3 provides for
the creation of a condominium by means of a recorded declaration, for
the maintenance and operation of the condominium through an associa-
tion of apartment owners, and for the termination of the condominium.
Other provisions of the act are directed toward specific points of pre-
existing state law which might have interfered with the condominium
scheme.
This note undertakes to describe the basic concepts underlying con-
dominiums, to point out some of the problems that may arise under the
Indiana legislation, and to suggest ways in which those problems may be
solved or minimized.
7. Kerr, supra note 3, at 518.
S. IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1202 (Burns Supp. 1963). The various sections of the
statute are referred to hereafter only by the section number within the statute. For ex-
ample, § 5 would be cited formally as IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-1205 (Bums Supp. 1963).
9. National Housing Act § 234, 75 Stat. 161 (1951), 12 U.S.C. § 1715(y) (Supp.
V 1963).
10. 24 C.F.R. § 234 (1962).
11. Model Statute for Creation of Apartment Ownership, FHA Form No. 3285.
12. E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT., §§ 33-551 to -561 (Supp. 1963); ARE:. STAT. §§ 50-1001
to -1023 (Supp. 1961) ; REv. LAWS OF HAWAII §§ 170A-1 to -44 (Supp. 1963); Ky. REv.
STAT. §§ 381.80-.990 (Supp. 1962); P.R. Civ. CODE tit. 31, §§ 1291-93(k); CODE OF LAws
OF S.C. §§ 57-471 to -493 (Supp. 1964); VA. ANN. CODE §§ 55-79.1 to -79.33 (Supp.
1962).
13. IN n. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1201 to -1231 (Burns Supp. 1963).
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I. ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS
The Initial Documents
After the decision to create a condominium has been made, it is
necessary under the Indiana act to draft and record documents establish-
ing the legal framework within which the individual apartments can be
conveyed and used.
The Indiana act applies only to real estate which meets certain physi-
cal standards 4 and which is brought within the act by a formal declara-
tion. 5 The declaration must contain a legal description of the land on
which the condominium is to be located,'6 a description of the building,"'
a description of the common areas and facilities,"8 any covenants and re-
strictions as to use, 9 the bylaws of the association of apartment owners
(the managing body of the condominium),2 and a statement of the value
of the entire condominium and each apartment within it, together with
the percentage of the undivided interest in the common areas and facilities
appurtenant to each apartment.2'
In regard to the last item, the formula set up in the statute for de-
14. Sections 2(a) and 2 (e). The physical standards set by the act impose the only
strict limitations. The condominium must consist of at least five apartments. It may
cover more than one building but only if each building contains at least two apartments.
Each apartment must either exit on a public thoroughfare or on a common way leading
to a public thoroughfare. Section 2(a).
As for functional standards, the act is quite permissive. Although condominiums are
usually thought of in the context of residential use, the act does not limit its coverage to
property put to such use. Apartments may be used "for residence, for office, for the
operation of any industry or business, or for any other type of independent use. ... "
Section 2(a). It is conceivable that the condominium may prove to be a most useful de-
vice for holding non-residential property, as in the case of a warehouse, where prospec-
tive owners each do not need that volume of storage which would make individual owner-
ship of the whole economically feasible.
15. Section 3. The declaration is the basic document by which property is submitted
to the act, and great care should be taken in its drafting. It will be observed repeatedly
in the balance of this note that many potentially dangerous difficulties can be avoided or
minimized by care and foresight at this initial stage.
16. Section 12(a).
17. Section 12(b).
18. Section 12(c). These include all parts of the property not contained in an
apartment. An omnibus provision to this effect might well be placed in the declaration
to provide additional protection against the danger that specific descriptions might fail
to identify a part, leaving responsibility for its maintenance undetermined.
19. Section 12(h).
20. Section 12(k). This section prescribes that the bylaws shall state the general
organizational structure of the association.
21. Section 12(e). The Federal Housing Administration has issued forms for the
declaration and the bylaws. These forms should be useful not only as an aid to assuring
that the condominium is so created as to qualify for FHA mortgage insurance but also
as a source of suggestions for other desirable provisions. FHA Form No. 3276-A
(declaration) ; FHA Form 3277 (bylaws). The Indiana act permits inclusion in both
the declaration and bylaws of provisions other than those required, if they are consistent
with the act. Sections 12(i) and 26(1).
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termination of these percentages seems defective. Section 7 (a) provides
that, unless otherwise specified in the declaration, the percentage "shall
be computed by taking as a basis the value of the apartment in relation
to the value of the property as a whole." Mathematical computation re-
veals that use of this formula will always leave a portion of the common
area unallocated to any apartment."  Full allocation in all cases can be ac-
complished only by "taking as a basis" the value of each apartment in re-
lation to the value of all of the apartments. The declaration should so
specify.
Finally, the declaration is not valid, and the provisions of the act
are not invoked, until the declaration is recorded.23
The Description of the Owner's Estate
The estate of an apartment owner in a condominium is unique. In
common-law terms it consists of two elements: a fee simple in severalty in
the apartment" and an undivided interest in the common areas,
owned in common with the rest of the apartment owners.25 This "estate
mix" is the result of adaptation of the unitary civil law concept of con-
dominium to the terms of the common law. It should be empha-
sized that, despite the superficially dual nature of the American adapta-
tion, the essentially unitary conception remains, for the two elements can-
not be separated during the existence of the condominium regime.26
The fee simple in severalty-connoting absolute and sole right of pos-
session of space and absolute alienability-provides a convenient method
for describing the broad interest the apartment owner obtains, without un-
due dislocation of traditional conceptions. As such, its use is probably justi-
fied. But, it is suggested, use of the term may encourage a tendency to
assume thereby a greater assimilation of the condominium interest into
22. For example, assume a condominium property valued at $300, $100 in apart-
ments and $200 in common areas. Assume further, three apartments valued at $50, $30,
and $20. The fraction set up by the statute, value of apartment/value of property,
would result in fractional interests of 50/300, 30/300, and 20/300 in the common areas,
the total of which would be 100/300. Fully two-thirds of the total value of the common
areas would remain unallocated. The unallocated portion is always represented by the
fraction value of common areas/value of the property.
23. Sections 3 and 15(a). The declaration is to be recorded with the county re-
corder in compliance with "all the laws of this state applicable to the recording of in-
terests concerning real property." Sections 12 and 15(b).
It may be that an unrecorded declaration incorporated by reference in a deed would
be binding on the grantor and the grantee, since in Indiana unrecorded deeds are binding
on the immediate parties. Givan v. Doe ex. demn. Tout, 7 Blackf. 210 (1844). However,
a third party trying to avoid the unrecorded declaration (for example, a creditor at-
tempting to attach a lien to the property as a whole) would seem to succeed by virtue of
§ 3, even, perhaps, where he had actual notice of the declaration.
24. Section 2(b).
25. Ibid.
26. Section 7(b).
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traditional property law than the superficial identity of descriptions of the
estates warrants and a failure to recognize the essentially unique nature of
the condominium.
The characteristics of the fee simple and its attendant doctrines
in large part have been determined by the nature of the thing to
which it applies-land, which is indestructible, immobile, characterized
by definite, usually easily ascertainable boundaries. In fact it has been
persuasively argued that, on the basis of current law, the jural nature of
land is not one of substance but is one of absolute, indestructible physical
space, no matter what form of substance happens to occupy it.2 In most
instances this is true. In contrast, it is arguable that the actual, useful
interest of the condominium owner, the interest which should be signifi-
cant for legal purposes, has no similar characteristics. The thing with
which the owner is basically concerned is not just a quantum of space, but
a quantum of space "enclosed" in "one or more rooms."28 As such, the con-
tinued existence of his interest is absolutely dependent upon the con-
tinued existence of man-made walls, the destructibility and mobility of
which, in contrast to land, should be obvious. (The distinction may be
only one of degree, but it is arguable that the difference in degree is so
great that it is advisable to treat it as one of kind for legal purposes.)
An immediate example of the consequences of this appears in the
divergence of the condominium owner's apparent fee simple interest
from that of the usual fee simple in land. Largely because of the
immortality of land, the traditional fee simple can be described, in
its temporal aspect, as perpetual. While the continued existence
of the interest here, as in condominiums, is dependent upon the
continued presence of the substance, absolute destruction of that
substance is so unlikely that it is only in the rare case that the
problem can arise. For practical purposes, the fee simple can be and is
considered immortal, and the law has not developed a well-considered
body of doctrine to account for the possibility of its destruction. In com-
parison, the fee simple in the condominium apartment has no similar tem-
poral aspect. While it shares with the fee simple in land a certain in-
definiteness of duration, there is a fundamental divergence in the cer-
tainty of its termination in the foreseeable future; the building will most
certainly waste away within that time. The statute provides for this
eventuality, but in so doing it makes the continuance of the owner's in-
terest through reconstruction contingent upon a vote of the association of
27. Ball, The Jutral Nature of Land, 23 Ii.. L. REv. 45, 58-66 (1928).
28. Section 2(a).
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co-owners. 29 That contingency is, of course, alien to the very idea of a
fee simple absolute.
Other conceptual difficulties arising from the fundamental diverg-
ence in the physical qualities of land and of the building of the condomin-
ium can be further illustrated, in the physical dimension itself, by the
case of destruction and reconstruction of the building of the condominium.
Application of the juristic conception of the fee simple as applied to land
(that is, as a continuing interest in an absolutely fixed quantum of space)
would seem to require, in the situation posed, a multiplicity of convey-
ances of portions of the owners' respective "spaces" to conform to the
apartments' new positions, which inevitably will differ from the original
positions even if a twxin of the first building is constructed. In terms of
the actual interests of the parties, a more meaningless exercise is difficult
to imagine, yet the traditional conception would seem to require it,
whether the fee is considered to have survived in the interim or to have
been revived on reconstruction. The difficulty here can be avoided by
the realistic observation that the owner's so-called "fee" inheres in some
quantum of space, but not necessarily in that which he originally acquired.
In sum, it appears that the "fee simple" obtained by the apartment
owner differs in as yet undetermined ways from the fee simple in land.
Distinctions in the physical substances which owners of land and of con-
dominium apartments own must lead of necessity to differing concep-
tions of the respective estates, though they be identified by the same
term. The practical significance for draftsmen of the point made is that
in describing an owner's estate emphasis must be placed on careful con-
sideration of the unique characteristics of the condominium and on de-
velopment of new rules for the rights and duties of the parties consistent
with those characteristics.
Section 13 of the Indiana act requires that, simultaneously with re-
cording the declaration, a set of floor plans of the condominium, certified
by a "registered architect or licensed professional engineer," be recorded.3"
These floor plans are required to show "the layout, location, apartment
numbers and dimensions of the apartment. . . ." Section 14 requires
that these plans provide a means of identification of the apartments by
letter or number, authorizes use of a form of deed description incorporat-
ing those letters or numbers in conveyances of apartments,3 and states
29. Section 21.
30. If the thesis presented above concerning description of the owner's interest is
accepted, the only purpose of the plans is to provide an easy means of identifying what
rooms are in each apartment and a brief means of referring to each apartment in con-
veyancing.
31. "[Slaid letter or number followed by the words in (name) Horizontal Property
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that that form of description "shall be deemed . . .a good and sufficient
description for all purposes; ' ' 2 but the wording of the section does not
seem to require that that particular form of deed description be used.
However, the statutory definitions of "apartment" and "common
areas and facilities" do not in themselves provide precise delineations of
the boundaries of the apartments.3 To avoid any conflict between apart-
ment owners or between an apartment owner and the association of apart-
ment owners concerning maintenance and reconstruction responsibilities,
the declaration should contain a provision clearly delineating the boun-
daries between apartments and between apartments and the common areas.
The FHA model declaration, for example, provides that the "finished sur-
faces of the perimeter walls" (including plaster) and interior walls and
partitions are a part of the apartment unit and not the common areas, but
that the "undecorated and/or unfinished surfaces of the perimeter walls,
floors, and ceilings" are a part of the common areas, along with "pipes,
wires, conduits or other public utility lines," regardless of their location."
This provision seems to be designed to keep the basic structure and utili-
ties within the common areas but allow the apartment owner to have con-
trol over interior decoration even, it seems, to the extent of removing
interior partitions as long as he does not disturb utility lines."
From the point of view of hazard insurance, however, the inclusion
of interior partitions and interior walls in apartment units, rather than in
the common areas, may cause difficulty for the apaxtment owner who,
unaware that he was responsible for their maintenance, did not insure
them. It is not clear under Indiana law whether the association of apart-
ment owners has an insurable interest in that part of the structure owned
in fee simple absolute by an apartment owner. 6 Therefore, the most
Regime as recorded in Book , p. - , under the date of
of the records of - County, Indiana."
32. This section also provides that the interest in the undivided areas adhering to
an apartment is conveyed by "any conveyance or transfer of interest in title of an in-
dividual apartment." In addition the section requires that any restrictions as to use and
the percentage of undivided interest adhering to the individual apartment "shall" be in-
cluded in the deed, even though the declaration is referred to, but not specifically in-
corporated by reference, in the form of deed description. See note 31 supra.
33. An "apartment" is defined as "one or more rooms." Section 2(a). "Common
areas and facilities" is not defined but rather is stated to include, among other things,
main walls, roofs, halls, corridors, and lobbies. Section 2(f).
34. FHA Form No. 3276-A, § I (3).
35. This assumes: (1) that the partition is not a "main wall," in which case it
would be a part of the common areas under § 2(f) (2) of the Indiana act; and
(2) that its removal would not jeopardize the soundness or safety of the property or
reduce its value, in which case the unanimous consent of the apartment owners is re-
quired for the removal. Section 9.
36. The definition of "insurable interest" in Indiana was laid down in Trader's Ins.
Co. v. Newman, 120 Ind. 554, 22 N.E. 428 (1889). It must be both "a certain, definite,
or specific interest in the property, either by contract or operation of law, and such an
NOTES
prudent course would be to encourage the apartment owners either to
carry insurance on their interests in the walls of their apartments as well
as the usual dwelling contents insurance or to contract to insure their
separate interests under one policy.
The Association of Apartment Owners
Section 2(d) creates an association of apartment owners, the ad-
ministrative structure of which is to be set forth in the bylaws." The
manner of the "maintenance, repair and replacement of the common areas
and facilities and payments therefor" is also to be set forth in the by-
laws, 5 and it is anticipated that these duties will be handled by the as-
sociation through its administrative structure. To accomplish this, the
association is vested with certain powers. It may bring actions "to re-
cover sums due, for damages or for injunctive relief" against apartment
owners if they fail to comply with the articles of incorporation or associa-
tion (as the case may be), bylaws, or administrative rules and regulations
of the association.39 The association must make its decisions giving each
interest that an injury to, or destruction of the property would involve the person in im-
mediate pecuniary loss. . . ." Id. at 560. (Italics added.) The rationale of this rule is
prevention of wagers contrary to public policy. VANCE, INSURANCE § 29 (3d ed. 1951).
It is difficult to find an insurable interest, so defined, in the association, since it would
have no prospect of "immediate pecuniary loss" in those elements of the building that are
part of a co-owner's apartment. On the other hand, § 19 requires that, short of
destruction of two-thirds of the building, insurance proceeds be devoted to reconstruc-
tion of the damaged portion. There is arguably no wager contrary to public policy since
the funds would inure to the benefit of the injured apartment owners, who do have an
insurable interest.
Section 18 of the Indiana act does not clearly resolve the issue. Although that sec-
tion gives a majority of the co-owners the right to insure the building and although
"building" is defined in § 2(e) to include the apartments, it can be argued that
§ 18 does not specifically expand the scope of "insurable interest" as defined by
prior law and that reference to a "majority of the co-owners" in that section does not
necessarily mean the association. This latter possibility is buttressed by the fact that
established precedent allows insurance of separate interests in separate property under
one policy. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. Wall, 36 Ind. App. 238, 247-48, 75 N.E.
668, 671 (1905), and cases cited therein. But this precedent would seem to allow the
co-owners to join in a single policy if their separate interests are specified. The object
of group insurance could thus be accomplished, albeit with somewhat more administrative
difficulty.
37. "'Association of Apartment Owners' means all of the co-owners as defined in
subsection (b) of this section acting as an entity in accordance with the articles, bylaws,
and declaration." Section 2(d).
Section 26 provides that the association have a president, board of directors, secre-
tary, and treasurer, and prescribes that the bylaws shall state the manner of their elec-
tion and their term of office.
38. Section 26(f).
39. Section 8. This phrase is the only allusion made in the statute to the legal
character of the association and has no active significance outside its context. Assum-
ing for the moment that the legal status of the association of co-owners is that of an un-
incorporated association the provisions of § 8 seem to be aimed at remedying the
inability of such entities to sue at common law. See Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalga-
mated Woodworkers, 165 Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877 (1905), and cases cited therein;
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apartment owner voting weight in accordance with the voting percentages
assigned to his apartment, and decisions based on the voting shall be bind-
ing on all co-owners.4 ° The association also may bring actions concern-
ing the common areas of two or more apartments, on behalf of any two
or more apartment owners."'
Although the association is described as an "entity" by the Indiana
act, the legal nature of that entity is not stated.2 It seems doubtful that
the act by itself gives the association corporate status. By stating that
apartment owners shall be bound by the lawful acts of the association,
"whether the Association of Co-Owners is incorporated under the Not
For Profit Corporation Act of this state or not," section 8 seems to im-
ply both that the Indiana act is not intended by itself to create a corpora-
tion43 and that it is permissible to incorporate associations of apartment
owners, at least under the Indiana General Not For Profit Corporation
Act. Even though the association has some corporate characteristics, it
has been said that the General Assembly can bestow some of the charac-
teristics of a corporation or an association without creating a corpora-
tion.44
Faultless Caster Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, 119 Ind. App. 330, 86 N.E.2d
703 (1949). Contra: Mullen v. Beech Grove Driving Park, 64 Ind. 202 (1878).
Unless otherwise stated, it shall be assumed in this note that the association is unincor-
porated. The issue of whether to incorporate the association is dealt with below in the
section concerning the liability of apartment owners.
40. Section 31 (b). Voting percentages must be stated in the declaration. Sections
12(e) and 12(g).
41. Section 30. Those powers of the association regarding liens are discussed in
the text accompanying note 56 infra.
42. See note 37 supra.
43. The Indiana General Corporation Act and the Indiana General Not For Profit
Corporation Act apply only to corporations formed under those acts. IND. ANx. STAT. §§
25-101 (a) and 25-508 (a) (Burns 1960). Submission of the association under one of
these acts, apart from the requirements of the Indiana Horizontal Property Act, is neces-
sary if those acts are to apply to the association.
44. In Hall v. Essner, 208 Ind. 99, 193 N.E. 86 (1935), where the legislature had
required partnerships in the banking business to issue certificates of stock, IND. ANN.
STAT. § 3928 (Burns 1926), joint liability for the partnership's debts was upheld in the
face of a contention that the statute had in effect created a corporation. The court said
that "the ultimate judicial test is whether the legislative intent was to create a legal in-
dividuality apart from, and legally independent of, the natural persons who are interested
in the enterprise in question. If an entity with legal individuality is created, it follows
that this legal person possesses the ordinary corporate advantages, unless some appropri-
ate legislative action expressly provides otherwise." Id. at 106. Although § 2(d)
defines the association as "all of the co-owners . . . acting as an entity," the dictum in
Hall would apply only if that entity had "legal individuality." The statements in Hall
imply that there can be entities without legal individuality.
However, the act confers the following characteristics normally attributed to corpor-
ations: power to sue (§ 8), centralization of management (§ 26), and perpetual succes-
sion (§ 2(d)), giving the association a life coextensive with the horizontal property
regime. In addition, the association is characterized by ready transferability of "shares,"
since §§ 5 and 2(d) make "shares" as transferable as apartment units. On the other
hand, the association does not have the distinctive corporate trait of limited liability.
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It might be argued that the association of apartment owners by vir-
tue of its creation is a partnership, if it could be said to have been formed
for the purpose of sharing losses in a common enterprise.45 This argu-
ment, however, has many serious weaknesses. First, partnerships must
have a business purpose," and it is strongly arguable that, of itself, the
management of property by its owners is not a "business." 4 This analy-
sis is strengthened by the fact that both the Uniform Partnership Act"
and prior Indiana law provide that common ownership of property does
not, of itself, establish a partnership.49 Since the association of apart-
ment owners involves a community of interest only for the purpose of
making feasible and facilitating the individual ownership of apartments
rather than the use of commonly owned property for a common business
purpose,"0 it seems that the rule just stated should apply to condominiums.
See HFNN, CORPORATIONS, § 78 (1961). In view of this last fact, and in view of the
language of § 8, quoted in the text accompanying note 43 spra, it is doubtful whether
the attributes noted are sufficient to bring it within the rationale of Hall.
45. See Watson v. Watson, 231 Ind. 385, 108 N.E.2d 893 (1952) ; Bacon v. Chris-
tian, 184 Ind. 517, 111 N.E. 628 (1916). Is collecting common expenses "sharing a loss"?
46. Waggoner v. Honey, 91 Ind. App. 81, 169 N.E. 349 (1929); Bond v. May, 38
Ind. App. 396, 78 N.E. 260 (1906).
This also is required by the Uniform Partnership Act, IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-406(1)
(Burns 1951) ; but associations created by any other statute are subject to the provisions
of that act only if they would be partnerships under prior law. IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-
406(2) (Bums 1951).
47. The Uniform Partnership Act defines "business" as every trade, occupation, or
profession. IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-402 (Burns 1951). Indiana case law has defined
"business" as "that which occupies the time, attention or labor of men for the purpose of
profit or improvement as their principal concern." Snyder v. Heinrichs, 115 Ind. App.,
129, 131, 55 N.E.2d 332, 333 (1944); Vandalia R.R. v. Stilwell, 181 Ind. 267, 291, 104
N.E. 289, 297 (1914). Neither of these definitions seems to fit the association of apart-
ment owners.
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-407(2) (Burns 1951).
49. Simms v. Dame, 113 Ind. 127, 15 N.E. 277 (1888) ; Waggoner v. Honey, 91 Ind.
App. 81, 169 N.E. 349 (1929) ; Bond v. May, 38 Ind. App. 396, 78 N.E. 260 (1906).
Accord, Bowen v. Deese, 196 Ga. 292, 26 S.E.2d 538 (1943); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1003
(1944).
50. This is not to say, of course, that if such a common business purpose did exist
the co-owners would not constitute a partnership. For example, in East Hill Cemetery
Co. v. Thompson, 53 Ind. App. 417, 97 N.E. 1036 (1912), a cemetery association, organ-
ized without capital stock under IND. ANN. STAT. 25-1519 to -1524 (Burns 1960) with
each lot owner a member of the association by virtue of his estate and having a vote in
the election of members of the managing body of the association, was held to constitute
a business rather than a charitable and benevolent association (the issue was whether
the officers of the association could be held to tort liability) because the association was
selling lots and there was nothing in the articles of association to prevent selling lots for
a profit and paying salaries and dividends. The sale of lots provided a common business
enterprise apart from the management of the property.
This case seems to warn condominium organizers not to give the association duties
beyond the management of the property that could give rise to a holding of common
business purpose (for example, development of the condominium and sale of apartments
by the association itself). As in the East Hill case, the finding of a common business
purpose could have consequences with regard to the co-owners' liability in tort and con-
tract. See text accompanying note 79 infra.
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A second essential difference between the association of apartment owners
and partnerships is the manner of their dissolution. The association of
apartment owners continues as long as the condominium exists." On the
other hand, there are a multitude of reasons for which partnerships may
be dissolved.52
It seems, therefore, the association of apartment owners is to be gov-
erned by the general law concerning unincorporated associations. There
is no indication that this categorization in any way expands the powers of
the association beyond those specified in the Indiana act, for it has been
held that unincorporated associations have no legal existence apart from
their members unless existence is bestowed by statute."3
One of the chief duties of the association would be the administra-
tion of common expenses. Section 11 provides that "common expenses
shall be charged to the apartment owners according to the percentage of
the undivided interest in the common areas and facilities," 4 and the
"manner of collecting from the apartment owners their share of the coin-
mon expenses" must be provided for in the bylaws."5 Section 22 states
that apartment owners are "bound" to contribute in the pro rata percent-
age of their individual undivided interest in the common areas and fa-
cilities toward the areas' and facilities' administration, maintenance, and
repair, and toward other agreed expenses.
To aid the association of apartment owners in collecting common
expenses, section 24 provides that unpaid common expenses assessed by
51. Section 2(d).
52. IND. ANN. STAT. § 50-429 to -432 (Burns 1951).
53. Popovich v. Yugoslav Nat'l Home Soc'y, 106 Ind. App. 195, 18 N.E.2d 948
(1939). The Indiana act has not, as have some other Indiana statutes concerning
various types of associations, bestowed "corporate" entity. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §
25-1511 (Burns 1960) (trustees of churches) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 27-905 (Burns 1960)(levee associations) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 30-604 (Burns 1949) (fencing associations)
IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4402(d) (Burns 1952) (fraternal beneficiary associations); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 59-801 (Burns 1961) (memorial and welfare associations); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 15-304 (Burns 1950) (county agricultural societies) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 15-1602
(Burns 1950) (agricultural cooperative associations).
54. 'Common expenses' means and includes:
(1) All sums lawfully assessed against the apartment owners by the Associa-
tion of Apartment Owners;
(2) Expenses of administration, maintenance, repair or replacement of the
common areas and facilities;
(3) Expenses agreed upon as common expenses by the Association of Apart-
ment Owners;
(4) Expenses declared common expenses by provisions of this act, or by the
declaration or the bylaws.
Section 2(g).
Section 7(a) states that unless the declaration otherwise provides, the percentage of
individual interest in the common areas and facilities shall reflect the ratio that the
value of the apartment bears to the value of the property as a whole.
55. Section 26(g).
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the association against any apartment constitute a lien "from the time of
assessment." This lien is to be "prior" to all other liens on the apartment
except tax liens in favor of any assessing unit or special district 6 and
sums unpaid on a first mortgage of record." Section 24(a) also pro-
vides that the manager or board of directors may bid at a foreclosure sale
under such lien, and the bylaws may provide for requiring the apartment
owner to pay rent after the foreclosure."8
Grantors and grantees of a voluntary conveyance are jointly and
severally liable for unpaid assessments of the association, except that a
grantee's liability can be limited to that amount indicated on a statement
which he may obtain from the manager or board of directors.59 Pur-
chasers at the foreclosure of a first mortgage of record, however, are not
liable for unpaid assessments on that apartment; and that share of the
common expenses is prorated over all of the apartments."0
II. TERMINATION PROBLEMS
Voluntary Termination
Section 28 of the Indiana act provides that under certain conditions
all of the apartment owners by unanimous consent can terminate the con-
dominium voluntarily and become tenants-in-common in proportion to
their former interests in the common elements.6 Consequently, one
56. Section 24(a). Section 17 provides that taxes shall be assessed against each
apartment rather than against the building as a whole and prohibits forfeiture or sale
for delinquent taxes of the buildings as a whole.
57. Ibid. The manager or board of directors is authorized to act on this lien "un-
der the laws of this state concerning mechanic's and materialmen's liens." IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 43-701 to -717 (Burns Supp. 1963). Section 43-703 requires that a lien, to be
effective, must be filed with the county recorder within sixty days and, when so filed,
becomes effective retroactively to the date the work began. By analogy, then, it seems
that the lien of the association, once filed, would become retroactive to the date of as-
sessment.
58. The sale is controlled by IiD. ANN. STAT. § 43-705 (Burns Supp. 1963). The
rent provision seems to arise from the fact that the former owner is entitled to possession
of real estate sold at judicial sale for one year from the date of such sale. IDi. ANN.
STAT. § 2-3919 (Burns 1933).
59. Section 23.
60. Section 24(b).
61. (a) All of the apartment owners may remove a property from the provi-
sions of this act by an instrument to that effect, duly recorded, provided that the
holders of all liens affecting any of the apartments consent thereto or agree,
in either case by instruments duly recorded, that their liens be transferred to
the percentage of undivided interest of the apartment owner in the property as
hereinafter provided.
(b) Upon removal of the property from the provisions of this act, the property
shall be deemed to be owned in common by the apartment owners. The un-
divided interest in the property owned in common which shall appertain to
each apartment owner shall be the percentage of undivided interest previously
owned by such owner in the common areas and facilities.
Section 28.
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apartment owner could keep the condominium alive in the face of any
challenge as long as the building remained standing. Such a "hold-out"
on the part of one apartment owner could damage seriously the interests
of the other apartment owners if, for example, the neighborhood was
changing into something other than a residential area and the value of the
building and the apartments for residential purposes was declining. Be-
sides suffering the obvious investment loss, the other apartment owners
would be legally obligated to continue to contribute their share of the
common expense."2
Of course, it could be said that voluntary termination of the condo-
minium estate by anything less than unanimous consent of the apartment
owners would place such power in the association as to be inconsistent
with the concept of a fee simple estate in each apartment owner. On the
other hand, it could be argued that the owner bought subject to this con-
dition. Furthermore, if the apartment ozuner's percentages of interest in
the common areas reflect the values of their apartments, the termination
of the condominium in accordance with section 28 does not alter the dol-
lar value of the apartment owner's interests.63 Although the individual
apartment owner no longer owns his individual apartment in severalty,
the extent of his tenancy-in-common expands to cover the whole property
rather than just the common areas-what he has lost is compensated by
what he has gained. However, a provision for voluntary termination by
less than unanimous consent does not seem to be possible in Indiana since
there is no express provision for waiving the requirement of unanimous
consent in section 28.4
A condominium bill introduced in the New York legislature pro-
vided, in part, that "only 80% of the apartment owners are required to
declare that the property is obsolete and should be sold and the proceeds
divided, subject of course to payment of outstanding liens on the apart-
62. Section 22 provides that an apartment owner cannot avoid his share of the ex-
pense of maintenance and repair of the common areas and facilities by abandonment or
waiver of use.
63. The basic market value of an apartment should represent the value of the apart-
ment plus the value of the fractional interest in the common areas that is appurtenant
to it. The assumption stated in the text will be true only if the declaration originally in-
cluded the non-statutory formula for determination of the interest in the common areas
recommended in the text following note 22 supra. If the statutory formula of 7(a) was
used originally, § 28 requires its use at this point, and the effect of failure to al-
locate the total value will be magnified.
64. Since waiver or variation from the act is specifically permitted in some sections,
e.g., § 7(a), the implication is that the declaration can counter the provisions of the
act only where specifically provided. Additionally, § 28 requires the consent of
lien holders to termination, and there is no provision in the act for varying their rights
in the declaration. For another discussion of the desirability of termination by less than
unanimous consent, see Kerr, supra note 3, at 511.
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ments."'  Permitting such a determination not only adequately protects
the majority of the apartment owners against the refusal of one or a
small number of apartment owners to sell when sale is clearly desirable
but also provides sufficient protection against unnecessary termination
of the horizontal property regime. Inclusion in the Indiana act of a
similar provision seems desirable.
DestructioL of the Building
A condominium also may be terminated in connection with destruc-
tion of the building. The destruction of the building is provided for in
sections 19, 20, and 21.06 There are, however, problems inherent in these
sections.
For example, sections 19 and 20 fail to provide for meeting the dif-
65. Id. at 512.
66. Section 19. In case of fire or any other disaster the insurance indemnity
shall, except as provided in the next succeeding paragraph of this section, be
applied to reconstruct the building.
Reconstruction shall not be compulsory where it comprises the whole or
more than two-thirds of the building; in such case, and unless otherwise unani-
mously agreed upon by the co-owners, the indemnity shall be delivered pro rata
to the co-owners entitled to it in accordance with provision made in the by-laws
or in accordance with a decision of three-fourths of the co-owners if there is
no by-law provision.
Should it be proper to proceed with the reconstruction, the provisions for
such eventuality made in the by-laws shall be observed, or in lieu thereof, the
decision of three-fourths of the co-owners shall prevail.
Section 20. Where the building is not insured or where the insurance in-
demnity is insufficient to cover the cost of reconstruction, the new building
costs shall be paid by all co-owners directly affected by the damage, in propor-
tion to the value of their respective apartments, or as may be provided by said
by-laws; and if any one or more of those composing the minority shall refuse to
make such payments, the majority may proceed with the reconstruction at the
expense of all the co-owners directly affected thereby including the dissenting
minority.
Section 21. If, within thirty days of the date of the damage or destruction
to all or part of the property, it is not determined by the Association of Apart-
ment Owners to repair, reconstruct or rebuild, then and in that event:
(a) The property shall be deemed to be owned in common by the apart-
ment owners;
(b) The undivided interest in the property owned in common which shall
appertain to each apartment owner shall be the percentage of undivided in-
terest previously owned by such owner in the common areas and facilities;
(c) Any liens affecting any of the apartments shall be deemed to be trans-
ferred in accordance with the existing priorities to the percentage of the un-
divided interest of the apartment owner in the property as provided herein; and
(d) The property shall be subject to an action for partition at the suit
of any apartment owner, in which event the proceeds of sale, together with the
net proceeds of the insurance on the property, if any, shall be considered as
one fund and shall be divided among all the apartment owners in a percentage
equal to the percentage of undivided interest owned by each owner in the prop-
erty, after first paying out of the respective shares of the apartment owners,
to the e-x-tent sufficient for the purpose, all liens on the undivided interest in the
property owned by each apartment owner.
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ference between insurance indemnity and cost of reconstruction when the
insurance indemnity is inadequate if the majority of the co-owners op-
pose reconstruction involving less than two-thirds of the building. Sec-
tion 19 plainly states that insurance indemnity shall be applied toward
reconstruction if the building is less than two-thirds destroyed. Since
section 20 states that a majority is needed to bind a dissenting minority
to reconstruction costs, one is led to the conclusion that on the facts of
this example insurance funds cannot be distributed since the property
must be rebuilt but that dissenting co-owners cannot be bound by con-
struction costs. This absurdity could be avoided by construing section 19
to apply only where the insurance indemnity is adequate for reconstruc-
tion. This might have been the intention of the draftsmen (the use of a
three-fourths vote in section 19 and a majority vote in section 20 is
consistent with this interpretation), but the contents of the two sections
are too different to support the bare inference that section 20 limits sec-
tion 19 in this manner."7 Until the relation of sections 19 and 20 is de-
fined more clearly by statutory amendment, however, the only way to
avoid this tangle is to be absolutely certain that insurance indemnities
are adequate.
Similarly, if section 19 applies to situations where the insurance in-
demnity is inadequate, in a case where the building is more than two-
thirds destroyed, does it require that the insurance indemnity be returued
to the co-owners (failing a unanimous vote) even though a majority of
co-owners "directly affected" binds the minority to reconstruction ex-
pense in accordance with section 20? If the common areas are damaged,
it appears that all co-owners are "directly affected," since all co-owners
have an interest in them, and section 20 seems to give, without exception,
a majority of co-owners power to bind the minority to its share of
construction costs. If so, it appears that reconstruction would be under-
taken on those terms, even though section 19 provides that if the build-
ing is more than two-thirds destroyed the insurance indemnity will be
returned to the co-owners, unless it is unanimously agreed otherwise.
This seems to be a fair reading of the statute, even though the result is
somewhat absurd. The result is avoided, however, if section 19 is con-
strued to apply only if the insurance indemnity is adequate.
A further uncertainty is added by the fact that "directly affected" is
subject to another construction. The phrase, if taken according to lay
understanding, would seem to mean "those who are injured in the use of
67. On the other hand if § 20 does so limit § 19, in the case where the building is
more than two-thirds destroyed, one is faced with the anomaly of a unanimous vote
requirement to rebuild if the insurance is adequate, but only a majority vote requirement
if the insurance is inadequate. If anything, the requirements should be reversed.
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their apartments." This construction is strengthened further by the fact
that, otherwise, there appears to be no reason for inclusion of the phrase.
If this construction is adopted section 20 does have a certain superficial
equity about it-the co-owners, having decided to underinsure the build-
ing as a whole, must undertake to self-insure those parts of the common
areas, deprivation of the use of which "directly affects" them.
However, if this latter construction is adopted, section 20 could be
extremely inequitable in application. It makes no provision for assessing
the respective degrees of effect which damage has on the use of various
apartments; and the owner whose use is only slightly affected will have
to share the expense equally with the owner who has been practically de-
prived of his use. Finally, and obviously, those owners not physically
affected by the damage will have the value of their undivided interests in
any common areas damaged restored without charge.
A third problem is whether, if the association does not act within
thirty days after destruction of all or part of the building, a co-owner
can bring an action for partition under section 21 even though the dam-
age subsequently was restored. The provisions of section 21 which turn
the condominium into a tenancy in common subject to partition are to
apply if within thirty days "it is not determined by the Association of
Apartment owners to repair, reconstruct or rebuild." Seemingly the pro-
vision is brought into application by a failure to act; and a subsequent
decision to rebuild, if made after thirty days from the date of the damage,
would require the complete legal re-creation of the condominium to oper-
ate the property again as a condominium. Otherwise, the property would
be subject to partition at the behest of any apartment owner-a situation
that would be intolerable.6"
In order to avoid this problem the reconstruction determination
should be made within the thirty day period. If it is not, the declaration
should be resubmitted and the condominium recreated. Such a course
would seem to be purely voluntary, however, and any co-owner not agree-
ing seems to have a right to partition under section 21.69
III. MISCELLANEOUS CONDO.IINIUIM PROBLEMS
Emninent Domain
The Indiana act does not specifically deal with the contingency of
68. The setting of a time limit appears advisable as a measure to force the associa-
tion to act with reasonable promptness. However, is the thirty-day period provided by
§ 21 too short to permit the assessment of the extent of the damage, the determination
of the probable cost of rebuilding or repair, and the reasoned deliberation required by
the importance of the decision to all parties?
69. Other apartment owners might be able to set up an estoppel against a co-owner
who first consents to rebuilding and then seeks a partition.
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eminent domain proceedings against a condominium. No particular prob-
lem arises once the entire property is condemned, for the condemnor, by
recording an instrument, could terminate the condominium under section
28. Eminent domain proceedings are often directed against only a por-
tion of a tract, however, and this creates problems for condominiums
that seem incapable of equitable solution."0 The basic concept of condo-
minium is individual ownership of apartments with a proportionate shar-
ing of common expense, and the act provides for condominiums consist-
ing of several buildings. When a condemnor takes over some, but not
all, of the apartments, this leaves fewer apartment owners to share the
common expenses. As a result the remaining co-owners must each pay
a larger percentage of the common expense than originally was contem-
plated in the declaration. This larger percentage might be reflected in an
increase in the amount paid for common expenses by each co-owner, since
the common expenses as a whole might not be reduced by an amount
proportionate to the area taken, but it is likely that this increase in ex-
pense could be reflected in condemnation damages."'
Increased damages, however, do not solve the problem of ownership
of that percentage of the common areas which formerly adhered to apart-
ments which have been transferred to an eminent domain condemnor.
Since the condemnor planning to raze the building he took would not be
interested in obtaining title to a percentage of the common areas of the
whole condominium, he presumably would not include that interest in the
condemnation proceedings, and the title to that interest would then re-
main in the former owner. Since that interest is no longer of value to
the former owner, and since it is undesirable to have partial title to the
common areas in the hands of a person with no real interest in their
proper maintenance, the former owner should convey his remaining in-
terest to those co-owners whose apartments survived the condemnation.
The remaining co-owners should then reform the declaration to adjust
the percentages of interest in the common areas and of common expense
liability adhering to each apartment, so that a 100 per cent interest in the
common areas is distributed among existing apartments. Covenants that
these steps will be taken should be contained in the declaration.
In Indiana, however, it can be argued that partial condemnation in-
volving the removal of apartments from the condominium cannot take
70. See Note, 14 HASTIN GS L.J. 327 (1963).
71. Although the general measure of damages for the partial taking of a tract is
the difference in fair market value 'before and after the taking, IND. ANN STAT. § 3-1706(Burns 1933), it has been held that additional expenses to the remainder, such as the
cost of constructing and maintaining fences made necessary by the condemnation, are
allowable, Glendenning v. Stahley, 173 Ind. 674, 91 N.E.2d 243 (1910). The analogy
to increased common expenses in a condominium is striking.
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place. Such an event is, in effect, a partition of the property between a
condemnor and the remaining co-owners, and section 7(c) precludes par-
tition by an apartment owner "or any other person" while the property
remains a condominium." Thus, it seems that an eminent domain con-
demnor who takes title to an apartment cannot by himself terminate the
condominium; and since he falls within the definition of "co-owner" in
section 2(b), the condemnor is bound, as are other apartment owners, by
the provisions of the Indiana act and by the declaration, bylaws, and de-
cisions of the association of apartment owners of the condominium. If
this theory is accepted, and being bound as any other co-owner does not
fit the purposes of the condemnor, it appears that he must either take the
entire property, or look elsewhere.
Of course, this would not mean that eminent domain could be exer-
cised only by a taking of the entire property but would mean that an apart-
ment and its portion of the common areas cannot be severed from an on-
going condominium. Section 7(c) seems in no way to prevent, for ex-
ample, the exercise of eminent domain to obtain a utility easement, since
this would not involve partition of the condominium. In such cases the
assessment of damages 3 in accordance with the change effected in the
fair market value of each interest involved seems equitable, since no
problems of allocating future common expenses arise.
Restraints on Alienation
Condominium co-owners not only live in close proximity to one an-
other, but also rely on each other financially in the sharing of common
72. "The common areas and facilities shall remain undivided and no apartment
owner or any other person shall bring any action for partition or division of any part
thereof, unless the property has been removed from the provisions of this act as provided
in sections 21 and 28. .... "
Although it has been held that the power of eminent domain is superior to private
rights of property and contract, State v. Flamm, 217 Ind. 149, 26 N.E.2d 917 (1940),
Southern Indiana Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Boonville, 215 Ind. 552, 20 N.E.2d 648
(1939), it has also been held that the power of eminent domain can be exercised only as
the legislature has established the "occasions, modes, and agencies for its exercise." Al-
len v% Jones, 47 Ind. 438, 442 (1874) ; see also Vandalia R.R. v. LaFayette & Logans-
port Traction Co., 175 Ind. 391, 94 N.E. 483 (1911); Richland School Twp. v. Over-
meyer, 164 Ind. 382, 73 N.E. 811 (1905); Leeds v. City of Richmond, 102 Ind. 372, 1
N.E. 711 (1885). Hence if the phrase "any other person" in § 7(c) includes emi-
nent domain condemnors, such an inclusion does not impair the power of eminent domain,
since the legislature has the power to say how and under what circumstances it may be
used.
There are general grounds for arguing that the word "person" includes corporate
bodies politic. The term is so defined in the Indiana Civil Code, IND. ANN. STAT. §
2-4701(5) (Burns 1946), and this statute has been construed to include the state, Erwin
v. State ex rel Walley, 150 Ind. 332, 48 N.E. 249 (1897), In re Burke, 66 Ind. App. 64,
123 N.E. 702 (1918).
73. IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-1706 (Bums 1933).
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expenses. In addition, the market value of each apartment depends in
part on the "neighborhood" created by the other co-owners. For all of
these reasons, condominium co-owners probably would demand a greater
degree of control over who their neighbors are than would residents of
the ordinary neighborhood. Although section 8, providing that the as-
sociation shall have the power to obtain judicial enforcement of "admin-
istrative rules and regulations," allows some measure of control over such
things as annoyances and disturbances from individual apartments, the
apartment owners obviously would want devices that are preventive as
well as curative. Hence, restrictions in the declaration on the sale of in-
dividual apartment units should be considered. The main problem fac-
ing the drafter of such a provision seems to be the rule against restraints
on alienation.7"
Indiana's general restraints against alienation rule, which is against
the strong weight of authority," is contained in the leading case of
Langdon v. Ingram's Guardian, where the court held that "a condition in
a grant or devise that the grantee or devisee shall not alienate is void, be-
cause repugnant to the estate, but a condition that the grantee or devisee
shall not alienate for a particular time, or to a particular person or per-
sons, is good."76  However, the "particular time" must be within the
period set by the Rule against Perpetuities." This unusually liberal rule
seems to permit such severe covenants as those voiding conveyances of
apartments to persons not approved by the association. Since the rule
might be changed, a safer technique might be a first refusal arrangement.
Rights of first refusal have been received much more favorably in
other jurisdictions since, if they do not state a price, they do not effect a
74. Of course, restrictions on a racial basis would be unenforceable under the rule
of Shelley v. Kraemer, 344 U.S. 1 (1948).
75. It has been suggested, 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.17 (Casner ed. 1952),
Gavit, Future Interests in Indiana, 3 IND. L.J. 506 (1928), that many of the later cases
following Langdon were based on a misconstruction of an Indiana perpetuities statute,
IND. ANN. STAT. § 56-142 (Burns 1933), giving it the import of allowing absolute re-
straints on alienation within the period of the Rule against Perpetuities, Minter v. Peoples
Nat. Bank, 95 Ind. App. 204, 182 N.E. 87 (1932) ; Guipe v. Miller, 94 Ind. App. 314, 180
N.E. 760 (1932); Vaubel v. Lang, 81 Ind. App. 96, 140 N.E. 69 (1923); Matlock v.
Lock, 38 Ind. App. 281, 73 N.E. 171 (1905).
These cases are not strong authority today. They are not supreme court cases, and
they are against the weight of authority in other jurisdictions. 6 Am. LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 26.24 (Casner ed. 1952). Also, the statute involved has been repealed, Indiana Acts
1945, ch. 216, § 6; and the present perpetuities statute, IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-105 (Burns
1951), does not lend itself to the same misinterpretation.
76. 28 Ind. 360, 362 (1867).
77. Fowler v. Duhme, 143 Ind. 248, 42 N.E. 623 (1896); Reeder v. Antrim, 64
Ind. App. 83, 110 N.E. 568 (1915); Phillips v. Heldt, 33 Ind App. 388, 71 N.E. 520
(1904).
The time period of the Indiana Rule against Perpetuities is life or lives in being
plus twenty-one years. IND. ANN. STAT. § 51-105 (Burns 1951).
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significant restraint on alienation." The technique would be simply to
covenant that an apartment owner, before selling his apartment to a third
party, would be required to offer the apartment at the same price to the
association. This device would be sufficient to prevent apartments from
falling into what other co-owners might feel were undesirable hands.
Liability of Co-Owners
If the association is given under section 26(f) the authority for
maintaining the common areas and facilities and under section 2 6(g) the
responsibility for collecting from each apartment owner funds to dis-
charge obligations that the association incurs in maintaining the com-
mon areas, what is the liability of the individual co-owners to creditors of
the association if the association defaults, either by refusal to make as-
sessments or inability to collect them ?79
At first glance, it may appear that the apartment owners could in-
sulate themselves by incorporating the association. Ordinarily, of course,
stockholders are not liable to creditors of a corporation except to the ex-
tent of unpaid subscriptions or consideration for stock (in the case of cor-
porations for profit) 0 or to the extent of unpaid membership dues or
assessments (in the case of corporations not for profit)." But, as the
incorporated association would be managing the co-owner-stockholders'
property and not its own, it arguably could be said to be acting as a
managing agent for the co-owners in their capacity of joint principals.8 2
78. 6 Am. LAW oF PRoPERTY § 26.24 (Casner ed. 1952). This technique is suggested
in Welfeld, The Condominium & Median Income Housing, 31 FORDHAm L. REv. 457,
464 (1963). Although no reported Indiana case has upheld rights of first refusal in
real estate, the arrangement has been upheld for shares of stock. Doss v. Yingling, 95
Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1932) (option period of ten days). For cases in other
jurisdictions upholding rights of first refusal in real estate, see, e.g., Campbell v. Camp-
bell, 313 Ky. 249, 230 S.V.2d 918 (1950) ; Warner & Swasey Co. v. Rusterholz, 41 F.
Supp. 498 (D. Minn. 1941) ; Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1936). For a
general discussion see 6 AMERICAN L.w OF PROPERTY § 26.67 (Casner ed. 1952).
79. Although there are no cases on this point involving condominiums, one old case
in another jurisdiction has allowed the bringing of a creditor's bill to force a statutorily
created turnpike company to make assessments of members as provided by statute to pay
its debts. Halbert v. Vanceburg Turnpike Rd. Co., 11 Ky. L. Rep. 721 (1890).
Old Indiana cases have held members of statutorily created drainage ditch associa-
tions jointly liable for judgments against the association returned indla bona. Todhunter
v. Randall, 29 Ind. 275 (1868) ; Shafer v. Moriarity, 46 Ind. 9 (1874). This approach
gives the creditor more direct recourse against individual members and allows him to
collect the amount due from among the members without regard to how much of the
condominium each member owns. Judgment creditors may choose among joint judgment
debtors as to which one or ones they will proceed against on execution. Fleming v.
McDonald, 50 Ind. 278 (1875).
80. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-205(h) (Burns 1960).
81. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-513 (Burns 1960).
82. See Berger, supra note 3, at 1007-08.
An agency is the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
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If so, the limited liability of shareholders would be irrelevant. There is
no authority for the proposition that a principal can avoid liabilities in-
curred in his behalf by an authorized agent merely because he happens to
be a stockholder of the agent. Hence, it appears that a creditor of the
association could strike through the entity, incorporated or not, and
reach the individual co-owners for obligations which the bylaws author-
ized the association to incur."s
The effect of such a finding of agency would be to make the apart-
ment owners either jointly or jointly and severally liable on the contract
of the association.84 Although section 10(a) authorizes attachment of
liens on individual apartments85 for authorized expenses on the common
areas only on a pro rata basis, there is no provision that a judgment
against the co-owners jointly shall create only pro rata liability. Hence,
an apartment owner as a judgment debtor in this situation could be forced
to pay much more than his ordinary proportion of the expenses on the
common areas.
The liability of the co-owners as principals could be limited. The
authorization in the bylaws may be worded in such a way as to authorize
the association to maintain the common areas and collect common ex-
penses but not to bind the co-owners as principals on contracts of the as-
sociation. However, the protection afforded by such a provision in the
bylaws is not certain since the creditor could attempt to establish either
apparent authority of the association or ratification by the co-owners.8
control, and consent by the other to act.
Department of Treasury v. Ice Service, 220 Ind. 64, 67, 41 N.E.2d 201, 203 (1941).
Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 1 (1958).
83. The same considerations and conclusion seem to apply where the association is
unincorporated. Although a distinction is sometimes drawn between associations for
business purposes and associations for fraternal or benevolent purposes in determining
whether an agency will be inferred or must be established on the facts, see, e.g., Brady v.
Mutual Benefit Dept. of Order of Ry. Conductors, 215 Ky. 177, 284 S.W. 1045 (1926),
this distinction is not relevant here if, as suggested above, the agency is made out from
the bylaws.
84. Contracts entered into by two or more persons with a third person are presumed
to be joint, unless the contracting parties have indicated their intent to be bound severally.
Cline v. Rodabough, 79 Ind. App. 258, 179 N.E. 6 (1931); 2 WILmsToN, CONTRAcrS §
322 (rev. ed. 1936).
85. Section 10 also provides that once the declaration is recorded a lien cannot be
effective against the property as a whole. Further, services or materials cannot form
the basis of a lien against an apartment unless they are furnished at the request of or
with the express consent of the apartment owner. Consent, however, will be
implied for emergency repairs of an apartment, such as repair of a plumbing leak when
the escaping water is damaging the apartments of contiguous owners, and for services or
materials authorized to be furnished for the common areas by the association, the board
of directors or manager, the bylaws, or the declaration.
86. If the intention of the drafters of the bylaws clearly is that the apartment
owners not be bound by such contracts, the agency is without express authority. The
creditor still may attempt to establish liability through the familiar agency doctrines of
apparent authority or ratification. Under apparent authority one dealing with a general
NOTES
It is submitted, therefore, that, if it is desired that apartment owners not
be bound jointly by contracts of the association, a statement that the as-
sociation only is bound by the contract be made in the contract itself."
Tort liability of the co-owners as a group poses a somewhat differ-
ent problem. It seems likely that the problem would only arise in per-
sonal injury negligence actions involving hazards in the common areas,
and hence the problem cannot be resolved, as with contracts as discussed
above, by the simple expedient of making who will be liable clear to third
parties. An injured licensee or invitee alleging negligent maintenance of
the common areas could proceed directly against the co-owners indi-
vidually or as a group, since the liability to licensees and invitees arises
from possession of the premises. 8 Even if the association, because of its
status as a managing agent, were held to be in possession, the result would
be the same since the possession of the principal's property by an agent
has been held to be possession by the principal.89 Thus, the co-owners, as
with contract liability, are faced with the possibility of joint liability for
condominium torts, a possibility made especially unattractive by the ap-
parent absence of a right to contribution from the other co-owners."
This problem for the most part may be solved by acquisition of ade-
quate liability insurance by the association with the co-owners as insured
parties. The importance of this cannot be overemphasized; if the associ-
ation fails so to insure its members an individual co-owner could protect
himself only by carrying liability insurance in an amount sufficient to
agent may recover from the principal regardless of private or secret instructions to the
agent of which the claimant is ignorant. Cruzan v. Smith, 41 Ind. 288, 297 (1872). See
also Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coffin, 186 N.E.2d 180, 182-83 (Ind. App. Ct. 1962).
It has been held that a managing agent of property can be inferred to have power to bind
the owner-principal if such power is reasonably necessary to fulfill his functions. Cooper
v. Davis, 112 Mont. 605, 121 P.2d 985 (1941).
87. This eliminates the creditor's apparent authority argument, since the creditor is
no longer ignorant of the limitations on the agent's authority. Such a disclaimer also
defeats any contention of ratification, since the contract could not then be made on the
credit of the principal. Bryan v. Ponmert, 110 Ind. App. 61, 37 N.E.2d 720 (1941)
Minnich v. Darling, 8 Ind. App. 539, 36 N.E. 173 (1894); RESTATEMXENT (SECOND),
AGENCY § 150 (1958).
88. See PROSSER, TORTS § 77, 78 (2d ed. 1955). The co-owners, as joint tortfeasors,
could be jointly and severally liable. Hoesel v. Cain, 222 Ind. 330, 53 N.E.2d 165 (1944),
rehearing denied, 222 Ind. 349, 53 N.E.2d 769 (1944).
89. Deakins v. Webb, 19 Tenn. App. 182, 84 S.W.2d 367 (1935). If this case were
not followed in Indiana, the co-owners as principals still could be held liable for torts
of the association within the scope of its agency. E.g., Town of Kirkin v. Everman, 217
Ind. 683, 28 N.E.2d 73 (1940), modified, 217 Ind. 692, 29 N.E.2d 206 (1940).
90. It seems that there is no right to contribution between joint wrongdoers in In-
diana. Jackson v. Record, 211 Ind. 141, 5 N.E.2d 897 (1937), Smith v. Graves, 59 Ind.
App. 55, 108 N.E. 168 (1915). Contribution can arise, however, by the wrongdoer's hav-
ing previously contracted to contribute. Nichols v. Nowling, 82 Ind. 448 (1882). Hence,
assuming that consideration can be found, a provision in the bylaws in which the co-
owners agree to contribute for torts of the association would be binding in contract.
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meet the total amount of possible tort judgments against the condo-
minium.
Taxation of Rental Income
Quite conceivably, a residential condominium, especially one located
in a prime downtown location, with a ground floor having high rental
value for business purposes, could rely on the rent of that floor to sup-
port a significant portion of its operating expense. It seems clear that
a reduction of common expenses resulting from receipt of rent would be
gross income to the co-owners. 1 A more difficult problem, however, is
whether the income also would be taxable to the association of apartment
owners.
The treasury regulations do not liiit corporate tax liability to those
groups recognized by state law as corporations but so tax an "associa-
tion" possessing the following characteristics: (1) "associates," (2) "an
objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom," (3) "con-
tinuity of life," (4) "centralization of management," (5) "liability for
corporate debts limited to corporate property," and (6) "free transfer-
ability of interests."92  However, "an unincorporated organization shall
not be classified as an association unless such organization has more
corporate characteristics than non-corporate characteristics."93  "Associ-
ates" and the object of business for profit are essential to this classifi-
cation.94
The criterion of "continuity of life" is met if the organization is not
dissolved by the elimination of one member." The owners' association
satisfies this criterion since under section 2(d) of the Indiana act the
association, defined as the "co-owners . . . acting as an entity," con-
tinues existence separate from transfers of ownership of individual units.
If a transfer of interest in an individual apartment can be accomplished
without the consent of the remaining co-owners, the criterion of "free
transferability of interest" is also met. 6
Whether there is "centralization of management" is less clear. Ac-
cording to the treasury regulations, this characteristic is present if "any
person (or any group of persons which does not include all of the mem-
91. See, e.g., Reynolds v. McMurray, 60 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1932); Jules C.
Winkleman, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Memo. 640 (1943).
92. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960).
93. Treas. Reg. § 301.7 701-2(a)(3) (1960).
94. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1960).
95. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (4) (b) (1960).
96. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (1960). If a co-owner must give the other co-
owners of the association a right of first refusal, the criterion of free transferability of
interest would not be affected. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (2) (1960).
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bers) has continuing exclusive authority to make the management deci-
sions necessary to the conduct of the business. . . ."" This is probably
descriptive of the managing body of most condominiums, at least with
regard to the managing of rental areas, since it is unlikely that co-owners
would be involved in the management of these areas apart from the
association."
The treasury regulations provide that if creditors may go against
individual members when an organization does not meet its obligations,
that organization does not have the characteristic of limited liability.99
Hence, if individual co-owners can be held liable as joint principals of the
association, this characteristic is not present.
A group must have a "business objective" to be taxable as an associ-
ation.1"' Although it has been held that the mere co-ownership of prop-
erty for the purpose of realizing rental income is not a "business objec-
tive," other characteristics in combination with co-ownership have led to
the opposite result." 1 On the basis of the cases it is uncertain how a con-
dominium, setting off rental income against the expense of managing a
commonly-owned building, would be classified. Since the courts have
tended to find a "business objective" on the basis of little else beside co-
97. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960).
98. If they were, however, the criterion would not seem to be met, especially if the
title to the rented area was not in the association but in the individual co-owners as a
part of the common areas. "[M]inisterial acts as an agent at the direction of a principal"
by themselves do not constitute centralized management. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (3)
(1960). (This assumes the agency-principal relationship discussed in the text accom-
panying note 82 supra.) It has been held, for example, that where all co-tenants were re-
quired to sign contracts for work on their property, "centralization of management" did
not exist. Burton S. Ostrow, 15 C.C.H. Tax Ct. Memo 957 (1956).
It should be noted that a taxpayer need not have title to real estate in order to be
subject to tax liability for income from it, if the taxpayer, rather than the owner, en-
joys the income. Thomas C. Wilwert, C.C.H. Tax Ct. Memo 1955-248 (Title to a room-
ing house was in a corporation of which the taxpayer was sole stockholder. The prop-
erty was managed out of the taxpayer's personal funds, for which he was allowed per-
sonal deductions and the income from which he could declare personally. In so doing,
the corporation did not have sufficient "business activity" to be a separate taxable en-
tity.) ; Rev. Rul. 62-178, 1962-2 CB 91, 627 CCH 7544 (An apartment cooperative hold-
ing a long-term lease on its building is "owner" of it for purposes of § 164(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code, since it has the entire enjoyment of the use of the building.).
99. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1960).
100. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (2) (1960).
101. E.g., Swanson v. Comm'r, 296 U.S 362 (1935) (a trust selling share in the
beneficial interest) ; Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369 (1935) (a
trust with power to acquire additional property). See also Gilford v. Comm'r, 201 F.2d
735 (2d Cir. 1953).
Where a corporation originally set up to liquidate the estate of a bankrupt continued
in operation for almost twenty years, acquiring further property, paying dividends, and
negotiating oil leases, it was held to be more than a conduit and to be a taxable entity.
Hagist Ranch, Inc. v. Comm's, 295 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1961). But when a trust with a
purpose similar to that of the corporation in H-agist did not outlive its original purpose
it was held not to be a taxable entity. Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223 (1919).
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ownership of property, there is a distinct possibility that a "business ob-
jective" would be found here.
An entity taxable as an association cannot take a tax deduction for
those amounts, representing income to the entity, by which it reduces ex-
penses owed it by its members."0 2 Consequently, it appears that a condo-
minium receiving rental income from a commonly owned unit might in-
cur corporate tax liability on that income under present law, and the pos-
sibility should be taken into account in setting up condominiums with
that feature.
Treasury regulations should define the status of condominiums rent-
ing out commonly-owned units to facilitate intelligent planning. In any
event, it seems that reasonable rental income of condominiums should be
exempt from corporate tax. If the condominium is residential, and the
rental income is within reasonable limits, it does not seem appropriate to
tax the condominium as an association since an aim of reducing the ex-
penses of maintaining a dwelling is not what one ordinarily thinks of as
a "business objective." Further, similar set-offs have been held to be con-
structively received and hence taxable income to the individual taxpayer."0 3
Conclusion
Most of the serious condominium problems can be greatly minimized
by wise planning and careful drafting of the documents by which the
condominium estate is created. Even in instances where the Indiana act
is unclear, careful planning and adequate insurance can avoid the serious
legal difficulty that otherwise might occur.
To be sure, the underlying law of condominiums needs clarification
in some areas, particularly the destruction of the building and the income
tax status of the association of apartment owners. In all fairness, how-
ever, it should be remembered that the Indiana act is only enabling legis-
lation and was not intended to solve every legal problem that might arise
in connection with condominiums. Most problems could have been solved
explicitly by extensive legislation, but only at a great loss of flexibility.
102. Chicago & Western Ind. R.R. v. Comm., 303 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1962) ; Ana-
heim Union Water Co., 35 T.C. 1072 (1961).
If title to a rental unit were in the co-owners as a part of the common areas, rather
than in the association, the condominium situation could be distinguished from the above
cases. To have corporate tax liability depend on such a distinction, however, would be
highly formalistic.
103. See cases cited at note 91 szupra.
